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INTRODUCTION
SYMPOSIUM: Incitement at 100—
and 50—and Today
FREE SPEECH AND VIOLENCE IN THE MODERN
WORLD
William D. Araiza† and Joel M. Gora††
2019 marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the Supreme
Court’s first consequential encounter with the First Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of speech, in a series of cases dealing with
opposition to the nation’s entry into World War I and its policies
opposing the Bolshevik Revolution.1 Those cases marked the
starting point for what could be called “the free speech century”: a
century in which free speech became elevated to a primary—some
would say the primary—constitutional commitment.2
Of course, with that elevation came a century of contestation
about what free speech meant, who had the right to exercise it, and
what government interests could justify its suppression. Nowhere
was this contestation sharper than in the realm of speech that is
alleged to incite violence. On the one hand, such speech, when part
of a call for radical political change, lies at the heart of the First
Amendment’s concern with allowing free discussion of all matters

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. We both thank the staff and editors
of the Brooklyn Law Review and Liz Alper for all their excellent work in hosting this
symposium.
1 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 617–18 (1919).
2 See, e.g., Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting) (describing the First Amendment as occupying a “preferred position” in the
hierarchy of constitutional values), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). The preferred position
idea eventually faded away. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Wallmeyer, Filled Milk, Footnote Four
& the First Amendment: An Analysis of the Preferred Position of Speech After the
Carolene Products Decision, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1019, 1020–
21 (2003) (describing it as having “faded away” after a decade).
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relating to self-government.3 But such speech can also pose great
risks to peace, public order, and public safety.4
The Supreme Court’s challenge over the last one hundred
years has been to mediate between these conflicting concerns.
The challenge remains, and indeed, is more acute than ever.
Today, the internet provides extraordinary opportunities for
group mobilization. We have seen the positive side of this
potential all over the world, when oppressed groups have used
social media to organize protests again repressive governments.5
But we have also seen the negative side, as forces of violence
have used those same tools to exhort others to perform violent
acts.6 The global anxiety over terrorism, and the ease with which
death and destruction can be wrought on a massive scale, only
accentuates our fear of those who would incite violence, whether
through new technologies or the old-fashioned methods of the
printed or spoken word.
On April 12, 2019, scholars gathered at Brooklyn Law
School to consider the past, the present, and the future of free
speech, and concerns about incitement that militate toward
suppression. The speakers provided incisive and timely insight on
these important matters—insight that is reflected in the papers
published in this symposium issue of the Brooklyn Law Review.7
Noted First Amendment litigator Floyd Abrams engages
these questions directly by considering the key words from Justice
Holmes’s canonical formulation for the constitutional standard
governing regulation of incitement speech8—the requirement that
any danger justifying such regulation must be “clear and present.”9
Mr. Abrams asks what types of “danger” are sufficiently “present”
to provide that justification, using as examples the Communist
teachings at issue in Dennis v. United States10 and The Progressive
3 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 183 (1999)
(describing “core political speech” as the context in which First Amendment protection “is
at its zenith” (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988))).
4 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1973) (per curiam) (dealing
with a protester’s exhortation to continue the illegal commandeering of a public street).
5 See, e.g., Heather Brown et al., The Role of Social Media in the Arab
Uprisings, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 28, 2012), https://www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/rolesocial-media-arab-uprisings/ [https://perma.cc/VAP8-JA5Y] (discussing the part played
by social media in the Arab Spring protests).
6 See, e.g., Julia Carrie Wong, 8chan: The Far-Right Website Linked to the Rise
in Hate Crimes, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/
aug/04/mass-shootings-el-paso-texas-dayton-ohio-8chan-far-right-website
[https://perma.cc/VK79-73P8].
7 Symposium, Incitement at 100—and 50—and Today, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2019).
8 See Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment and the Imminence of Harm, 85
BROOK. L. REV. 7 (2019).
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
10 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497–98 (1951).
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magazine’s publication of plans for constructing a hydrogen
bomb.11 While Mr. Abrams reaches no hard and fast conclusion on
this exceptionally difficult question, his discussion places both the
difficulty and the stakes of that issue in stark relief.
Emerson Sykes, a staff attorney with the American Civil
Liberties Union, takes the next logical step after Mr. Abrams’ article
and considers the history, current status, and possible future of the
equally canonical modern formula for incitement, expressed in
Brandenburg v. Ohio.12 Mr. Sykes provides a rich history of the
Brandenburg litigation, explains the requirements it establishes
before the First Amendment allows a speaker to be convicted of
incitement to violence, and discusses Brandenburg’s impact on
modern speech controversies and its role in the world of social media.
While he considers whether other nations have something to teach
Americans about the allowable realm for provocative speech, and
whether the phenomenon of social media changes the calculus, Mr.
Sykes argues that Brandenburg’s basic preference for allowing such
speech retains its fundamental vitality.
Professor Rachel VanLandingham considers in more
detail one question raised by Mr. Sykes: the issue of social
media.13 In particular, Professor VanLandingham assumes that
government is, or should be, disabled from restricting social
media speech that fails the current Brandenburg test for
incitement.14 But she then asks whether the government should
have greater power to pressure social media operators—as the
intermediaries—to restrict speech on their social media
platforms. Professor VanLandingham discusses whether allowing
such informal government pressure would cause the same
degradation of democratic political dialogue that would flow from
more direct government regulation.
In a similar vein, Professor David Han engages the
fundamental issue of whether the stringently speech-protective
Brandenburg formula can survive the threats of violence and
terrorism enabled and enhanced by the internet and social media
age.15 His concern is that Brandenburg—the product of an era
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 990, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
See Emerson J. Sykes, In Defense of Brandenburg: The ACLU and Incitement
Doctrine in 1919, 1969, and 2019, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 15 (2019); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (limiting the leeway government has to punish speech
advocating illegal action to situations in which that speech is “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
13 See Rachel E. VanLandingham, Words We Fear: Burning Tweets & the Politics
of Incitement, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 37 (2019).
14 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
15 See David S. Han, Brandenburg and Terrorism in the Digital Age, 85 BROOK.
L. REV. 85 (2019).
11
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where militant speech was often confined to leaflets and soap
boxes—may be viewed as obsolete in the contemporary digital
world of instant global communication. He suggests that an effort
to bring its principles “up to date” would result in a balancing
readjustment between speech and security that might subordinate
speech. Professor Han maintains that it is better to resolve those
issues through the prism of the persuasion presumption, the
principle at the heart of Brandenburg, rather than a kind of
instrumental balancing. This approach would lead to a deeper and
more honest conversation about the fundamental principles
underlying Brandenburg’s insistence that, except in the most
extraordinary circumstances, speech seeking to persuade, rather
than incite, to violence cannot be restrained, and render any
incursions on that principle more narrow and tolerable.
Professor Christina Wells is also concerned about
terrorism threats being used to justify lowering Brandenburg’s
protective shield for provocative and challenging speech and
dissent.16 In her view, the insistence on imminence of violence
caused by speech is the core of Brandenburg’s protection, a
safeguard undermined by broad proposals to target “terrorism”
speech. The important mission of Brandenburg was to repudiate
a half-century of watered-down protection under the “clear and
present danger” test. The United States government used fears
of “Communism” and other “isms” as the pretext for attacks on
dissident groups and individuals legitimately pressing for
political and social change. Similar threats of repression have
emerged today in the effort to equate terrorism with certain
groups and advocacy efforts, while ignoring similar threats from
the other side of the ideological aisle. Professor Wells’ answer to
avoid the pitfalls of the past is a rigorous reaffirmation of the
Brandenburg test, which will not leave us defenseless against
true threats of terrorism.
Finally, however, Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs submits
that there are circumstances where the Brandenburg rules
overprotect speech.17 In her view, the paradigm for withholding
protection is where a speaker exhorts her listeners to engage in
violence and properly suffers criminal penalty if the incitement
tests are met. But courts have given protection in a number of
other dissimilar contexts. Professor Jacobs focuses on government
management of nonpublic forums. In this circumstance,
16 See Christina E. Wells, Assumptions About “Terrorism” and the Brandenburg
Incitement Test, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 111 (2019).
17 See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, “Incitement Lite” for the Nonpublic Forum, 85
BROOK. L. REV. 149 (2019).
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application of the traditional Brandenburg requirements of
imminence and unlawful acts may need to be relaxed to affect a
more proper accommodation of speech rights and public or private
harms. An adjusted incitement exclusion from protection, which
she dubs “incitement lite,” would alter some elements of the
Brandenburg test, so it would no longer be a blunt, one-size-fitsall incitement category. But “incitement lite” would preserve
Brandenburg’s spirit by defining different, more nuanced, and
tailored scopes of government authority to regulate speech that
persuades listeners to engage in harmful conduct.
Together, the papers published in this edition constitute
important contributions to the freedom of speech concerns that
burst upon the constitutional stage in 1919 and have never left it.

